The claim asserts that banks, when permitted to operate with fewer regulatory constraints, became very greedy, and that this largely explains the financial crisis. This is well-supported by multiple authoritative sources. **Evidence:** 1. **The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) Final Report (2011)** concluded that "dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions were a key cause of this crisis," noting that "too many of these institutions acted recklessly, taking on too much risk, with too little capital." The report attributed this to "more than 30 years of deregulation and reliance on self-regulation by financial institutions" which "stripped away key safeguards." The FCIC also noted that compensation structures "created incentives to increase annual revenues and market share, without properly taking into account risks." 2. **Joseph Stiglitz**, writing for the FCIC, stated: "The main cause of the crisis was the behavior of the banks—largely a result of misguided incentives unrestrained by good regulation. … The banks misjudged risk, wildly overleveraged, and paid their executives handsomely for being short-sighted; lax regulation let them get away with it." 3. **The UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (2013)** found that standards failings were not "the result of the action of a few rogue individuals or the odd dysfunctional bank" but rather "a collapse of trust on an industrial scale" resulting from "common deficiencies of standards and culture" enabled by "poor regulation" and a "political culture which reinforced those instincts." 4. **Academic research on UK banks** (published in the Journal of Banking Regulation) found evidence that "greed, recklessness and dishonesty formed part of the banking culture" at major UK banks between 2004–2009, and that "greed is the primary factor which led to the financial crisis." 5. **Brookings Institution analysis** confirmed that "financial institutions borrowed more and more money (i.e. increased their leverage) to finance their purchases of mortgage-related securities" in an environment of "poor regulatory oversight," and that "poor incentives, the bubble in home prices, and lack of transparency" drove reckless behavior. The claim's core assertion — that banks, when allowed to operate with fewer constraints, engaged in greedy and reckless behavior that largely explains the financial crisis — is corroborated by official government inquiries, parliamentary investigations, and academic research on both sides of the Atlantic. The qualifier "to a large extent" is appropriate, as the FCIC identified bank behavior as "a key cause" (not the sole cause), with regulatory failure being an enabling factor — which is consistent with Farage's framing that both the banks and those who allowed it bear responsibility. Sources: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Final Report (https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/fct/fcic_report_final_20110127.pdf); FCIC Conclusions (https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_conclusions.pdf); Joseph Stiglitz, "Capitalist Fools" (https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2009-1020-Stiglitz-article.pdf); UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, "Changing Banking for Good" (https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtpcbs/27/27ii05.htm); Brookings Institution, "The Origins of the Financial Crisis" (https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan.pdf); Journal of Banking Regulation, "Greed, recklessness and/or dishonesty?" (https://doi.org/10.1057/jbr.2014.1)