The claim "Brussels is not accountable" is a broad political characterization. The evidence shows that EU institutions in Brussels are subject to multiple formal accountability mechanisms, though their practical effectiveness is debatable. **Accountability mechanisms that exist:** - The **European Parliament** (directly elected) has powers of political scrutiny over the Commission: it can vote a motion of censure to force the entire Commission to resign, it must approve the Commission President and the College of Commissioners, it can put questions to Commissioners, and it controls the budget discharge process. - The **European Court of Justice** can compulsorily retire a Commissioner for serious misconduct (Article 247 TFEU). - The **European Court of Auditors** audits EU finances. - The **European Ombudsman** can investigate maladministration. - The Santer Commission resigned en masse in 1999 after a damning independent report on fraud and mismanagement, triggered by Parliament's threat of a censure vote. **Limitations as of December 2011:** - No motion of censure had ever been successfully passed — the threat had only forced the collective resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999. - No individual Commissioner had ever been formally sacked for incompetence. In the Santer case, the two Commissioners at the center of the scandal refused to resign, and there was no mechanism to remove them individually (this was only addressed by the Treaty of Nice, which gave the Commission President power to compel a Commissioner's resignation, later strengthened by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009). - The Commission President's power to dismiss individual Commissioners was relatively new (post-Lisbon 2009) and had not been tested. **Assessment:** The claim that "Brussels is not accountable" is an overstatement. Multiple formal accountability mechanisms existed as of 2011 — parliamentary scrutiny, censure powers, judicial oversight, audit institutions, and the ombudsman. However, the practical record was weak: no individual Commissioner had been removed through these mechanisms, and the censure power had never been successfully exercised. The claim captures a real democratic deficit concern but is contradicted by the existence of established accountability institutions. Sources: - European Parliament, "Supervisory powers" — https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/parliaments-powers/supervisory-powers - European Parliament, "The European Parliament: Powers" (Fact Sheets) — https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/19/the-european-union-s-institutional-framework - European Parliament Research Service, "The European Parliament's oversight powers" (2025 study) — https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2025/765768/EPRS_STU(2025)765768_EN.pdf - BBC News, "EU plunges into crisis" (16 March 1999) — http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/297457.stm - Wikipedia, "Santer Commission" — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Santer_Commission_Resignation - Cotter & Butler, "The President of the European Commission and the Power to Request a Commissioner's Resignation" (CML Rev. 2024) — https://findresearcher.sdu.dk/ws/portalfiles/portal/264744122/COLA2024044.pdf