Farage's claim is a rhetorical exaggeration of a real but partial phenomenon. The academic literature on EU "blame games" confirms that EU membership does create structural opportunities for national politicians to shift or obfuscate blame. Multiple peer-reviewed studies (Hobolt & Tilley 2014; Heinkelmann-Wild et al. 2020) establish that delegation to EU institutions can produce "blame shifting" and "blame obfuscation" effects, allowing national governments to distance themselves from unpopular policies. However, the claim that politicians get "none of the responsibility" is contradicted by the same body of research in several important ways: 1. The effect is partial, not absolute. The empirical research shows national governments still receive substantial blame even after delegation. In the financial bailout case studied by Heinkelmann-Wild et al., member state governments still received 34% of public blame attributions even after delegation to the independent ECB (down from 62%, but far from zero). In the border control case, member states retained roughly 31–38% of blame attributions regardless of delegation design. 2. Politicians and media rarely blame the EU in practice. Hobolt & Tilley's book "Blaming Europe?" found that "neither politicians nor the media assign much blame to the EU" — the opposite of what Farage's narrative implies. National politicians and domestic media tend to attribute responsibility to national governments, not Brussels. 3. National politicians are co-decision-makers. As UCL's Professor Ronan McCrea notes, "in the vast majority of cases when the EU acts, it can do so only when a majority of member states (and sometimes every member state) agrees." National ministers in the Council of Ministers are directly involved in EU legislation, meaning they retain substantive responsibility for outcomes. 4. The effect varies by policy area and delegation design. The research shows blame avoidance depends on whether delegation is to independent or dependent agents, internal or external actors, and whether the policy requires active national-level implementation. There is no uniform "no responsibility" outcome. The claim captures a real dynamic — EU delegation creates blame-avoidance opportunities — but the absolute phrasing "none of the responsibility" is a significant overstatement contradicted by empirical evidence showing politicians still bear substantial responsibility and still receive significant public blame for EU-related policies. Sources: - Hobolt, Sara B. and James Tilley, "Blaming Europe?" (Oxford University Press / LSE): https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/86734/ - Hobolt & Tilley, "Who's in charge? How voters attribute responsibility in the European Union" (Oxford): https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:bcbcadb2-e623-4479-b4d9-277c7aa33733/files/m486cf3668a4379c26b5d3e9a3cfc3214 - Heinkelmann-Wild et al., "Blame shifting and blame obfuscation: The blame avoidance effects of delegation in the European Union" (European Journal of Political Research / Cambridge Core): https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-political-research/article/blame-shifting-and-blame-obfuscation-the-blame-avoidance-effects-of-delegation-in-the-european-union/44024EC3B906D8C1934AF2832F23FEBF - LSE European Politics Blog, "Whose fault is it really? How policymakers in the EU shift the blame when things go wrong" (2020): https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/01/30/whose-fault-is-it-really-how-policymakers-in-the-eu-shift-the-blame-when-things-go-wrong/ - UCL News, "Opinion: It's too easy to blame Brussels for vaccine delays" (2021): https://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/2021/mar/opinion-its-too-easy-blame-brussels-vaccine-delays